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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The income tax cuts of 2001 were enacted when the federal budget was running a
surplus. The tax cuts of 2003, designed to boost the economy as it was showing signs
of weakness, were approved before the federal debt rose to the top of the national
agenda. Both sets of cuts are scheduled to expire at the end of 2010, and in the coming
months Congress and the administration will have to decide whether to extend them
at a time when the debt is climbing steadily but the economy remains fragile.
As the expiration date looms, several options are on the table. One option is to extend
the tax cuts indefinitely, making them permanent for all taxpayers. Another is to limit
the extension to individuals making less than $200,000 and married couples earning
less than $250,000. In light of the continuing weakness in the economy, some have
proposed extending the tax cuts for everybody for another two years. Finally, there
is the option of allowing the cuts to expire as scheduled.
A new study by the nonpartisan Pew Fiscal Analysis Initiative examines each of
these options, calculating their costs, with interest, and e"ects on the national debt.
Pew’s analysis assumes no other policy changes that would a"ect spending or revenue.
Pew’s analysis does not advocate for or against an extension. But it concludes that
even an extension limited to individuals making less than $200,000 andmarried
couples earning less than $250,000would sharply increase the debt unless lawmakers
cut spending to compensate for it. In contrast, allowing the tax cuts to expire as
scheduled or extending them for only two years would lead to a significantly
smaller debt in 2020 than would be the case under other options.
Making the tax cuts permanent for all taxpayers, regardless of income, would
cost $3.1 trillion over the next 10 years and inflate the national debt to 82 percent
of GDP. This would be the highest level since 1948, in the aftermath of World
War II, and well above the average debt-to-GDP ratio of the last 50 years of
37 percent. The current ratio is about 57 percent.
Limiting the extension to individuals making less than $200,000 and married
couples earning less than $250,000 would cost about $2.3 trillion in the next
decade. Absent any o"sets, this proposal would inflate the national debt to
78 percent of GDP by 2020.
Extending the tax cuts for all taxpayers for only two years, as some have proposed
in light of the fragile economy, would cost $558 billion over the next 10 years
and increase the debt to 70 percent of GDP by the end of the decade.
If the tax cuts are allowed to expire at the end of 2010, the debt-to-GDP
ratio would rise, reaching 68 percent by 2020.
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INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 2001 the first Harry Potter film had yet to arrive in theaters,
September 11thwas just another day in the calendar and the federal budget was running
a surplus. Earlier in the year the Congressional Budget O!ce (CBO) had estimated
that the nation’s budget surplus would be $281 billion in fiscal year 2001, largely the
result of several years of rapid economic growth. The public debt was expected to
decline from its level of 35 percent of GDP at the end of fiscal year 2000 and to continue
falling. TheCBOnoted someweakening in the economy, but predicted that after a short
dip growthwould pick up and by 2011 the budget surpluswould approach $889 billion.1
It was in this context that Congress passed, and President Bush signed into law in
June 2001, broad tax cuts that carried a $1.35 trillion 10-year price tag.2 Two years
later, in an e"ort to spur growth after the economy had weakened, they enacted a
more narrowly focused set of tax cuts at an additional estimated cost of $350 billion.3
Both laws are set to expire at the end of 2010. In the comingmonths, Congress and
the president must decide whether to allow the cuts to expire as scheduled or extend
some or all of them.
This decision will be made in a fiscal environment that is markedly di"erent from the
one in which the tax cuts were enacted. Instead of a surplus the federal budget had a
$1.4 trillion deficit at the end of fiscal year 2009.National debt currently stands around
57 percent of GDP.4With no extension of the tax cuts or new spending initiatives,
debt will continue to grow for the next two years and then level out, remaining above
60 percent of GDP for the rest of the decade. Pew’s analysis shows that even a partial
extension of the tax cuts, as proposed by the administration within its larger fiscal
year 2011 budget plan, would inflate the national debt to 78 percent of GDP by 2020,
the highest level since 1950.5 A two-year extension of the cuts, with a sunset at the
end of 2012, would raise debt to levels only slightly higher than with no extension.
BACKGROUNDON THE CUTS
The tax cuts were enacted as two separate pieces of legislation, the Economic Growth
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA) of 2001 and the Jobs and Growth Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act ( JGTRRA) of 2003.6 The 2001 law contained a variety of
tax cuts, including rate reductions in the top four brackets, the creation of a new 10
percent bracket for a portion of income previously taxed at 15 percent and awidening of
brackets for married filers (“marriage penalty relief ”). It also contained more targeted
measures, such as increases in child-related tax credits, tax incentives for retirement
savings and investments in education, a phase-out of the estate tax and changes to the
gift tax. Most of the provisions were phased in gradually and are scheduled to expire
at the end of 2010.
The 2003 law cut taxes on capital gains, dividend income and certain business expenses.
It also accelerated the phase-in of a number of the income tax cuts in EGTRRA—for
instance, moving full implementation of the income tax rate reductions from 2006
to 2003. Under JGTRRA, the dividend and capital gains tax reductions were
scheduled to expire in 2008. However, subsequent legislation extended the expiration
date for the capital gains and dividend cuts to the end of 2010 and extended other
EGTRRA provisions. Those changes brought the total cost of the 2001 and 2003
legislation to $1.8 trillion.7 (For additional detail on the various cuts, including
estimates of the costs of the various components, see Appendix A.)
The provisions in the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts had widespread e"ects: A fifth of
tax filers claimed a child tax credit in 2003,while 11 percent took an education credit
or deduction for student loan interest.8 But the income tax rate cuts were by far the
most significant. They applied to taxpayers in every income bracket and constituted
over half the total cost of the cuts. The first table in Appendix B compares the rates
implemented by EGTRRAwith those that would prevail if the tax cuts expire
as scheduled. One analysis found that in 2006, shortly after implementation of the
cuts, more than 90 percent of taxpayers with incomes over $40,000 paid less taxes.9
FISCAL EFFECTS OF EXTENDING THE 2001 AND 2003 TAX CUTS
The 2001 and 2003 cuts were approved and enacted with expiration dates, yet
their extension is treated by many policy makers as all but inevitable. The fiscal
year 2011 budget proposed by the Obama administration begins from a baseline
that assumes that all the cuts will be extended. Likewise, when Congress enacted
a law in early 2010 requiring that certain new spending or losses in tax revenue
be o"set, they exempted most of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts from the requirement.10
In contrast, Pew’s analysis treats a possible extension of the tax cuts for what it really
is—a policy choice—and we measure the fiscal e"ects of this choice against a baseline
that does not assume their extension. Looked at this way, a decision to extend the
tax cuts is tantamount to enacting a new tax cut.
Starting in 2002 the U.S. budget has run a deficit each year. After the economy
entered a recession the size of the deficit grew sharply, to 9.9 percent of GDP
at the end of fiscal year 2009.11 The government must finance annual deficits with
new borrowing, which increases the national debt and requires larger annual interest
payments, adding further to the size of annual deficits. This phenomenon is not
unlike that experienced by someone who pays only the minimum charge on his
credit card while continuing to add to the outstanding balance with additional
spending and interest charges.
Rising debt threatens the country’s economic well-being. Persistent high deficits can
crowd out capital, reducing productivity and real wages. High debt also increases
pressure on the Federal Reserve to purchase publicly-held debt, which could increase
inflation. Thus it is important to consider the potential e"ect an extension of the tax
cuts would have on future deficit and debt levels, in addition to looking at their costs.
3
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No Extension of Tax Cuts
Pew’s analysis starts with the CBO’s March 2010 budget projections for fiscal years
2010 to 2020. This CBO baseline assumes that Congress will make no changes to
current law and will allow the tax cuts to expire as scheduled.12
With no extension of the tax cuts, the CBO baseline projects deficits will be
6.6 percent of GDP in2011 and thendrop to 4.1 percent of GDP in2012 (see Figure 1).
By 2014 the deficit would be 2.6 percent of GDP, around the level experts identify
as sustainable.13 It would remain just below 3 percent for several years and then start
to rise at the end of the decade. The CBO projects that debt will continue to rise over
the next two years. It will then level o" at about 66 percent of GDP for most of the
next decade, rising slightly to 68 percent of GDP in 2020.
Extend All EGTRRA and JGTRRA Provisions
Extending all of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts would cost $2.57 trillion over 10 years.14
The cost increases to $3.1 trillion over the same decade when $580 billion in interest
payments, as estimated by Pew, is added to the total (see Appendix C for an annual
breakdown of projected direct costs and debt service payments).
An extension of all of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts would raise future deficit and
debt levels significantly. Figure 2 shows that extending all of the tax cuts would
increase the size of the deficit to 4.2 percent of GDP or higher in each of the
next 10 years. As Figure 3 shows, the e"ect on public debt would be even more
striking—it would rise continuously, reaching 82 percent of GDP by fiscal year 2020.
FIGURE 1: Federal Deficits and Debt: No Extension of Cuts
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President Obama’s Proposal for a “Middle-Class” Extension
President Obama’s fiscal year 2011 budget includes a complete package of spending
initiatives and o"sets. The Pew analysis isolates the provisions extending certain 2001
and 2003 tax cuts, but does not consider the full budget. The proposal Pew examines
would extend tax cuts for the middle class, which the administration defines as single
taxpayers with incomes under $200,000 and married taxpayers with incomes under
$250,000, while allowing the cuts for taxpayers above that threshold to expire.15
The proposal also would do the following:
Expand the 28 percent tax bracket to include single taxpayers with
incomes up to $200,000 and married couples making up to $250,000
who are currently in the 33 percent bracket and who would be in the
36 percent bracket if the tax cuts expire (see the second table inAppendix B).
Extend the capital gains tax reductions and continue the elimination of
limits on itemized deductions and exemptions for “middle-class” taxpayers.
Restore the estate tax for all taxpayers, which was eliminated at the end
of 2009, to the level that prevailed in 2009.
People with incomes above these “middle-class” thresholds would continue to pay
lower rates on their earnings up to the thresholds (see Appendix B). This structural
feature, along with the fact that relatively few people would be subject to the higher
rates, does little to reduce the cost compared to a full extension. The cost of this partial
extension would be $2.3 trillion over the next decade, including debt service costs.16
This proposal would result in deficits of over 3.8 percent of GDP throughout the
decade, above the administration’s own target of 3 percent of GDP (see Figure 2).17
As Figure 3 shows, debt would rise to 78 percent of GDP by 2020, only four
percentage points lower than with a full extension of the cuts.
The Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) forms a parallel income tax system under
which taxpayers calculate their tax using a special AMT exemption amount instead
of the standard exemption and most deductions. If their tax liability is higher under
the AMT calculation than under the regular income tax calculation, taxpayers must
pay the di"erence in the form of an AMT.
The AMT exemption amount is not indexed for inflation, and as incomes rose
increasing numbers of taxpayers became potentially subject to the AMT. In 2010
one in six taxpayers will face the AMT under current law, compared to less than 1
Continued...
TAXCUTS ANDTHEAMT INTERACTION
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A Two-Year Extension of the Tax Cuts
Many who are concerned about the high cost of extending the tax cuts acknowledge
that it would be unwise to let them expire while the economy is still fragile.
One strategy would be to extend the cuts for two years, with a sunset at the end
of 2012. The cost of a two-year extension would be $558 billion, including debt
service, over the next 10 years.20 A two-year extension would increase deficits
significantly in fiscal years 2011 and 2012, but the cost would drop sharply in
subsequent years. Starting in 2014 deficits would be about one-tenth of a percentage
point higher than if there had been no tax cut extension (the di"erence is due to higher
debt service costs attributable to the extension). Debt would rise to 70 percent of
GDP by 2020, well below the debt to GDP ratio under both the Obama extension
proposal and a full extension (see Figure 3).
percent in 2000.18 In response, Congress has regularly approved temporary
adjustments to theAMTexemption amount that reduced the number of taxpayers
subject to it. Each of these annual adjustments (or AMT “patches”) has a cost that
is equal to the amount of AMT revenue that is foregone as a result of the change
in the exemption level.
Provisions that lower regular income tax liability will increase the number of
people potentially subject to the AMT. Thus, extending the tax cuts and continuing
to adjust the AMT exemption amount results in an interaction that adds an additional
cost beyond the cost of either measure alone.
For example, the cost of the administration’s limited tax extension proposal alone
would be $2.3 trillion (including debt service costs) between 2011 and 2020. The cost
of adjusting the AMT for inflation alone would be $704 billion (including debt service
costs) for this period. Combining the twowould add an additional $729 billion (including
debt service costs) to the total cost because of the interaction between the two measures.19
These two changes, the administration’s proposal and continued AMT adjustments,
together would result in deficit levels above 4.4 percent throughout the decade.
By 2020, debt would reach 84 percent, six percentage points higher than with the
tax cut extension alone. Similarly, combining an AMT adjustment with a full extension
of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts would increase deficits to 4.8 percent or more and increase
debt to 88 percent in 2020.
TAXCUTS ANDTHEAMT INTERACTION ...continued
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FINANCING THE CUTS
What would it take to extend the tax cuts without adding to the national debt?
Figure 4 compares the savings that could be gained from certain spending reductions
with the direct cost of extending the cuts (excluding debt service).21 These are not
proposals; rather they are examples chosen to illustrate the type of trade-o"s that
would be necessary to fully finance an extension of the cuts.
For example, eliminating U.S. international development and humanitarian aid
over the course of the next 10 years would free up $307 billion, just 12 percent of
the cost of a full extension of the cuts. Likewise, the three-year freeze in non-security
discretionary spending (spending on programs other than defense and related programs)
proposed in the administration’s fiscal year 2011 budget pays for only about 10 percent
of a full extension and 13 percent of the cost of its own proposal to extend the cuts
for single taxpayers with incomes under $200,000 and joint filers with incomes under
$250,000. Even freezing all discretionary spending, including defense, would o"set
less than half the cost of a full extension of the cuts.22
A 10 percent decrease in projected Social Security benefit payments over the next
10 years would be significant for recipients, for whom the average monthly payment
is $1,067.23 But such a cut would pay for just half of the Obama plan and only
36 percent of extending all the tax cuts.
FIGURE 4: Can Spending Cuts Pay for a Tax Cut Extension?
In Billions of Dollars
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Source: Pew analysis based on Congressional Budget Office data; costs for International Assistance and Discretionary
Spending Freeze are based on data in the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget proposal.
Note: Cost estimates are for the ten-year cost (2011–2020) and exclude debt service.
Extend All 2001 and 2003 Tax Cuts
Fr
ee
ze
N
on
-S
ec
ur
ity
D
isc
re
tio
na
ry
Sp
en
di
ng
Cu
t a
ll
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t a
nd
H
um
an
ita
ria
n
As
sis
ta
nc
e
Ai
d
Cu
t S
oc
ia
l S
ec
ur
ity
Be
ne
fit
Pa
ym
en
ts
by
10
Pe
rc
en
t
Fr
ee
ze
Al
l
D
isc
re
tio
na
ry
Sp
en
di
ng
at
20
10
Le
ve
ls
Cu
t A
ll
M
an
da
to
ry
an
d
D
isc
re
tio
na
ry
Sp
en
di
ng
by
5
Pe
rc
en
t
Cu
t A
ll
M
an
da
to
ry
an
d
D
isc
re
tio
na
ry
Sp
en
di
ng
by
7
Pe
rc
en
t
Obama
Proposal
However, paying for the tax cutswith a broad-based set of spending reductions could
potentially cover the costs. Assuming cuts could bemade to allmandatory anddiscretionary
spending (excluding required payments on the debt), a cut of about 5 percent across the
boardwould o"set the ten-year cost of the administration’s proposal. Likewise, a 6.8
percent across-the-board cut over 10 years (again, excluding payments on the debt)
would o"set the costs of a full extension of the cuts over the same period.
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The projections of tax cut costs in this paper are based on a conventional analysis
that reflects certain assumptions about taxpayer behavior, but does not take into
account potential increased macroeconomic activity that the tax cuts may induce.
Some policy makers argue that analyses of tax cut proposals should take into account
new economic activity that could occur when individuals and firms change their
behavior in response to lower tax rates.
Tax cuts can stimulate the economy, leading to increased tax revenue that may o"set
some of the costs. However, the extent to which the increased revenue makes up for
revenue lost from the cut is more di!cult to determine and depends on a number of
variables, including work behavior and savings and consumption decisions, as well as the
particular type of tax that is cut. The stimulative e"ect also depends on how and when
the tax cut is financed. Financing tax cuts with deficits can crowd out capital investment
in plants and equipment and ultimately work to dampen the economy over time.
Two attempts at dynamic analysis looked at the extent to which tax cuts may
pay for themselves. In a 2005 study, the CBO analyzed the e"ects of a 10 percent
cut in all federal taxes on income (regular income, capital gains income, etc.) that was
deficit-financed for the first 10 years.24 The CBO found that the e"ects of such a
change could o"set between 1 and 22 percent of the costs over the first five years
following the cut.
However, the CBO also found that the dynamic e"ects in the second five-year period were
ambiguous. In some economic models, dynamic e"ects could reduce the costs of a tax
cut by as much as 32 percent; in other models, dynamic e"ects could actually increase
the costs of such a tax cut by 5 percent. Another study by the Department of the
Treasury in 2006 also found ambiguous results.25
CANTHE TAXCUTS PAY FORTHEMSELVES?
CONCLUSION
This analysis shows that a full extension of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts without
o"sets would add significantly to U.S. deficits and raise federal debt in 2020 to
the highest levels in 60 years. The more limited extension proposed by the Obama
administration also would lead to substantial increases in the debt. Meanwhile,
it would be di!cult to pay for these extensions with spending cuts from any one
program area. A two-year extension with a sunset in 2012 would result in a 2020
debt level only slightly higher than with no extension. While Pew’s report makes
no recommendations about what course of action should be chosen, it does provide
an objective picture of what alternate scenarios wouldmean for spending, deficits and
the debt, and it demonstrates the extraordinary challenges—and choices—that
policy makers face as they consider our fiscal future.
Pew Economic Policy Group: FISCAL ANALYSIS INITIATIVE
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APPENDIX A: Description of the 2001 and 2003 Tax Cuts
Created a new 10 percent bracket. Reduced rates in
top four brackets.
Expires: 12/31/2010
Item Description
Billions
of Dollars
(through
2010)
EGTRRA (2001): INCOME-RELATED CUTS
Income Tax
Rate Cuts
923.5
Increased standard deduction for married couples. Allowed
married filers with higher incomes to qualify for the Earned
Income Tax Credit.
Expires: 12/31/2010
Marriage
Penalty Relief
109.7
Repealed limits on the use of itemized deductions and
the personal exemption for upper-income taxpayers.
Expires: 12/31/2010
Repeal of
deduction and
exemption
provisions
27.2
Increased the Child Tax Credit from $500 to $1000 and
made it partially refundable.
Expires: 12/31/2010
Child Tax
Credit
241.6
Increased and made permanent the adoption credit. Increased
the dependent care credit. Created new credit for employer-
provided child care.
Expires: 12/31/2010
Other Child
and
Dependent
Care Credits
6.9
Continued...
Provisions included an increase on the limit for tax-deductible
contributions to education IRAs and a permanent exclusion
for undergraduate tuition assistance from employers. Allowed
wider use of pre-paid tuition plans andmademost distributions
from plans tax-free.
Most provisions expire on 12/31/2010
Education
Saving and
Assistance
Incentives
28.4
Provisions included an increase in contribution limits
and “catch-up” contributions for IRAs. Increased annual
contribution and benefit limits for pensions.
Original 2010 expiration for provisions was repealed
by the Pension Protection Act of 2006.
Pension and
IRA Provisions
44.8
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EGTRRA (2001): ESTATE TAX
Increased exemptions for the estate tax and lowered the rate
from 55 percent to 45 percent in 2009. Eliminated the estate
tax starting in tax year 2010. Lowered the gift tax rate to 35
percent starting in tax year 2010.
Expires: 12/31/2010
Estate and
Gift Tax
84.1
JGTRRA (2003)
TOTAL FROM ENACTMENT THROUGH 2010
OUT-YEAR COSTS (2011 FORWARD)
TOTAL COSTS
1,661.0
145.1
1,806.1
Eliminated the 10 percent tax onmost capital gains for taxpayers
in the two lowest tax brackets and reduced the rate from
20 percent to 15 percent for taxpayers in higher brackets.
Expires: 12/31/2010
Capital Gains 29.6
Made the tax rates on dividend income identical to the tax
rates on capital gains; previously dividend income was taxed
at regular income tax rates.
Expires: 12/31/2010
Dividend
Income
139.0
Expanded the ability of businesses to immediately deduct
some of the cost of new equipment, rather than claiming
depreciation deductions over time.
Expired in 2004 and 2009 respectively, but subsequent
legislation has extended and further expanded these
provisions.
Business
Growth
Incentives
26.0
Source: Pew analysis of cost based on Joint Committee on Taxation estimates
Note: Costs reflect the initial cost estimates of provisions contained in the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001 (EGTRRA), Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA), and also the cost estimates for provisions
that accelerated or extended certain EGTRRA and JGTRRA cuts (the provisions were contained in the Working Families Tax
Relief Act of 2004 and the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2006). Adjustments to the Alternative Minimum
Tax that were included in this legislation are not reflected in estimates here. Out-year costs reflect the net effect of revenue reductions
and increases that will occur after 2010 due to timing of revenue collections for certain taxes.
Continued
Item Description
Billions
of Dollars
(through
2010)
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APPENDIX C: Cost Projections for Extensions
For all budget projections and simulations, Pew’s analysis uses a basic budget model
that projects the accumulation of federal debt over time. The model uses data from
the Congressional Budget O!ce (CBO), O!ce of Management and Budget (OMB),
and the Joint Committee on Taxation ( JCT), and forecasts spending, outlays, deficit
and debt at the end of each federal fiscal year.
Model Framework
Major components that are needed to calculate deficits and debt are spending, revenue,
interest rate, net interest and Other Means of Financing (OMF). These component
parts are described below.
Spending andRevenue
The basic primary spending categories are Social Security,Medicare net of o"setting
premiums, federal Medicaid, other mandatory and total discretionary spending.
The revenue categories include income tax, corporate tax, social insurance tax and
other revenue. Data for these categories are drawn directly from CBO projections.
InterestRate
This model uses the interest rates implied by the CBO baseline, which is found
by dividing net interest by the average of debt held by the public at the beginning
of the year and at the end of the year.
Net Interest
Pew calculates net interest under di"erent policy scenarios by multiplying the interest
rates described in the previous section by the average debt held by the public at the
beginning of the year and at the end of the year.
Other Means of Financing
Other Means of Financing (OMF) includes various factors that reduce or increase the
government’s need to borrow. A sale of assets, for example, provides the government
with additional funds and reduces its need to borrow to finance its deficit; this is recorded
as a negative OMF value. Certain credit financing, however, increases the government’s
need to borrow. For instance, when the government issues a loan, the full amount of
the loan is disbursed up front, even though the government anticipates that the loan will
be paid back. While the budget reflects only the recorded outlay, which measures
only the estimated cost for the loan subsidy and risk of default, the government must
provide funds up front for the full amount of the disbursement. For this reason,
many government loans, including small business and student loans, result in positive
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OMFvalues in the periodwhen the loan is disbursed, increasing the government’s
need to borrow, but result in lower OMF values in the period when the loan is repaid.
For all projections, OMF is equal to the level specified in the CBO baseline.
Deficit and Debt Calculations
Future levels of deficit and debt can be derived from themodel. The deficit is equal
to total outlays, less total revenues. Debt held by the public is equal to debt at the
beginning of the year, plus the deficit, plusOMF. This framework enables themodel
to calculate debt and deficit at the end of each fiscal year.
1 Congressional Budget O!ce,The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2002-2011 ( January
2001), pp. 2-3; Table 1-1. InMay the CBO lowered the surplus projection for 2001 slightly to
$275 billion, noting some unanticipatedweakness in revenue collections, but expressed continued
confidence in the long-term economic projections; seeAnAnalysis of the President’s Budgetary
Proposals for Fiscal Year 2002 (May 2001), pp. 2-3; Table 1.
2 Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimated Budget E!ects of the Conference Agreement for H.R. 1836
(May 26, 2001).
3 Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimated Budget E!ects of the Conference Agreement for H.R. 2,
The “Jobs andGrowth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003” (May 22, 2003).
4 Congressional Budget O!ce,AnAnalysis of the President’s Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 2011
(March 2010), Table 1-1, p. 2. Current debt as a percent of GDP is calculated using data from
the Department of the Treasury (Monthly Statement of the Public Debt) and the Bureau of
Economic Analysis in the Department of Commerce.
5 O!ce of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2011
(March, 2010), Historical Tables, Table 7-1, p. 133. FollowingWorldWar II public debt
ranged from 109 percent of GDP in 1946 to 84 percent in 1948 and 80 percent in 1950.
6 EGTRRAwas signed by the President onMay 7, 2001 (Public Law 107-16); JGTRRA
was signed onMay 28, 2003 (Public Law 108-27).
7 See notes 2 and 3 for cost estimates for EGTRRA and JGTRRA. For cost estimates of
provisions contained in subsequent legislation, see the relevant sections of the Joint Committee
on Taxation’s Estimated Revenue E!ects of the Conference Agreement for H.R. 1308, The “Working
Families Tax Relief Act of 2004” (September 23, 2004) and Estimated Revenue E!ects of the
Conference Agreement for the “Tax Increase Prevention andReconciliationAct of 2006” (May 9, 2006).
Cost estimates reflect both the loss in tax revenue and the increase in outlays for refundable tax
credits. The $1.8 trillion estimate includes $1.66 trillion in costs through 2010 plus additional
costs that occur after 2010 due to the timing of revenue collections.
8 IRS Statistics of Income (All Returns: Sources of Income, Adjustments, Deductions, Credits,
and Tax Items) for 2003.
9 Leiserson, Greg andRohaly, Je"rey.TheDistribution of the 2001-2006TaxCuts:Updated Projections,
November 2006 (Urban Institute andBrookings InstitutionTax PolicyCenter, 2006), p. 3 Table 1;
incomes are expressed in 2006 dollars. Note these are “taxpaying units”—tax filers, whether
single or married, rather than individuals. As the report notes, a smaller percentage of taxpayers
with incomes below $40,000 received benefits because many did not owe taxes.
10 Public Law 111-139, passed in January 2010, reinstitutes the so-called “pay-go” rules, but
contains language exempting most of the EGTRRA and JGTRRA provisions.
11 Congressional Budget O!ce,AnAnalysis of the President’s Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 2011
(March 2010), Table 1-1.
12 Congressional Budget O!ce,AnAnalysis of the President’s Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 2011
(March 2010). Legislation enacted after, and not reflected in, this analysis includes theHiring
Incentives to Restore Employment Act andThe Patient Protection and A!ordable Care Act.
13 In testimony before the Senate, Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke said it was a “rule
of thumb” that deficits should be around 2.5 to 3 percent in order to keep debt in control.
(Christian ScienceMonitor, February 25, 2010, accessed at http://www.csmonitor.com/Money/
2010/0225/Bernanke-to-Senate-If-you-want-to-fix-job-deficit-don-t-forget-budget-deficit).
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NOTES
14 Cost estimates for a full extension of the 2001 and 2003 cuts come from Table 1-5 of the
Congressional Budget O!ce’sThe Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2010 to 2020
( January 2010).
15 For a description of the income calculation seeDepartment of the Treasury,General Explanations
of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2011 Revenue Proposals (February 2010), pp. 127-131.
16 Cost estimates for the administration’s proposed extension of “middle-class” cuts come from
three sources: a) The decline in revenue comes from Table 1-3 of the Congressional Budget
O!ce’sAnAnalysis of the President’s Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 2011 (March 2010). CBO’s
estimate includes both the extension of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts and the interactive e"ect of
indexing the AMT to inflation; b) To isolate the cost of just the extension of the tax cuts, the
model subtracts the cost of the interactive e"ect of indexing the AMT, which is estimated in
Table 1-5 of theCBO’sTheBudget andEconomicOutlook: FiscalYears 2010 to 2020 ( January 2010),
from the total estimate in (a); and c) Finally, the model adds the cost of the refundable portion
of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, and these estimates come from Footnote 2 of the Joint
Committee on Taxation’s Estimated Budget E!ects of the Revenue Provisions Contained in the
President’s Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Proposal (March 2010).
17 O!ce of Management and Budget director Peter Orszag said last fall that “[I]n the medium
term out in 2015, 2016, 2017, we need to get to something around 3 percent of the economy
so that debt is no longer rising as a share of the economy.” Bloomberg.Com, November 17,
2010, accessed at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601070&sid=ajXWeF_mSko0.
18 Congressional Budget O!ce,The Individual AlternativeMinimumTax ( January 15, 2010), p.1.
The increase in liability is due both to passage of the tax cuts and to inflation and income growth.
19 Pew’s calculation of interactive AMT e"ect is based on data from the Congressional Budget
O!ce’sThe Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2010 to 2020 ( January 2010), Table 1-5.
20 Cost estimates for the two-year extension are based on data in Table 1-5 of the CBO’sThe
Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2010 to 2020 ( January 2010). For fiscal year 2013 the
report assumes that one-quarter of the full cost is incurred due to di"erences between tax and
fiscal years (one-quarter of the 2012 tax year occurs in the federal government’s 2013 fiscal year).
21 The technical budget rules require that a true o"set for a tax cutmust come from a cut in a
mandatory spending program or a tax increase, however this comparison includes discretionary
spending items in order to illustrate the magnitude of the cost of a tax cut extension.
22 Ten-year estimate of outlays for international development and humanitarian aid comes
from Table 26-14, Analytic Perspectives, Budget of the U.S.Government, Fiscal Year 2011
(March 2010). Pew’s estimate of savings from a three-year freeze on non-security discretionary
spending is based on information contained in 2011 budget. For the estimate of savings from
a freeze on all discretionary spending, seeCongressionalBudgetO!ce,The Budget and Economic
Outlook: 2010-2020 (January 2010),Table 1-5.
23 Social Security Administration,Monthly Statistical Snapshot, March 2010, accessed at
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/stat_snapshot/; estimates for savings from a
10 percent cut in Social Security spending are based on CBO projections; see Congressional
BudgetO!ce,TheBudget andEconomicOutlook: 2010-2020 ( January 2010), Table 3-1.
24 Congressional Budget O!ce,Analyzing the Economic and Budgetary E!ects of a 10 Percent Cut
in Income Tax Rates (December 1, 2005).
25 O!ce of Tax Analysis, U.S. Department of the Treasury,ADynamic Analysis of Permanent
Extension of the President’s Tax Relief ( July 25, 2006).
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